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PATRICK A. HEELAN, S.J.

AFTERWORD

THE HERMENEUTICS OF NATURAL SCIENCE
In this volume Stephen Toulmin and Allan Janik have represented me as the person who
converted Hans-Georg Gadamer to the recognition that the natural sciences and
technology are hermeneutical, like history, art, the humanities, and the social sciences.
That is, they are constituted by human meanings embodied in language, symbols, and
cultural practices. The two cultures of the natural sciences and the human arts are
thereby brought together under a common historical hermeneutical umbrella that gives
shape to all science, technology, and culture – even to theology (see below). I doff my
hat with respect – and deep appreciation – to Stephen and Allan. But I continue to
muse: surely it took a slew (Gaelic from ‘sluagh,’ a tribe) to change such a strongly
entrenched tradition of which Gadamer was chief! W ho were the members of this tribe?
Stephen, of course, was one, a special one. Allan too, and Babette Babich – and others.
I still recall with excitement my encounter with Gadamer at Boston College in April
1974 when I spoke up to challenge him about his exclusion of the natural sciences and
technology from the umbrella of human hermeneutic constitution. Memories, warm
memories!
The issue in question also has a certain majesty. Aristotle and Plato were the Magi
from the Middle East whom the W est followed consistently for two thousand years and
more, in pagan, Christian, and post-Christian times. They taught that knowledge was
expressible only in objective universals, and that such knowledge became science only
when integrated through laws and theories that permitted inferences to be made by
mathematical or logical deduction. Euclid’s geometry was a model, and so was
Archimedes. In such a science, however, there was no place for randomness, contingency, and human freedom, that is, for the stuff of real individuals, real history, real
emergent development, and real social choices. Universals trimmed the differences
among real individuals and reduced the latter to “irrationals.” Biological evolution and
other forms of emergent development stem from contingent opportunities that are
similarly “irrational.” History can do no better because it refuses to trim real events of
their particularity; the stories it tells are about “irrational” events. Even technologies,
because they re-shape the lives of real men and women in ways not deducible from
general laws, so they too, despite their association with the sciences, are “irrational.”
Finally, society itself turns out to be “irrational,” because it is the maker and transformer
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of the languages, representations, and cultural practices through which knowledge is
handed down from generation to generation in ever new and unpre-dictable words,
grammars, forms of discourse, and cultural activities.
It was to account for a local community’s science of the local real life-world that the
hermeneutics of Da-sein (Heidegger’s term for the human subject) was introduced.
Heideggerian ontological (or existential) hermeneutics criticizes the universality and
theory-ladenness of science. The theory-laden practices of science, however, produce
new real life-world phenomena that are post-theoretical and (mistakenly? metaphorically? ironically?) named by theoretical names. But are these so-named phenomena
truly “theory-laden” realities, I mean, are they constituted by theory? Heidegger
answers correctly, No! But we who come later need to push the question further. Since
such post-theoretical phenomena (though theoretically named) are the products of
practices that embody new theory-based technologies and institutions, we need to reflect
further on why they are not constituted by the theory which provides their names. Only
the abstract model elements named by the theory are constituted by the theory. In
contrast, the phenomena named by the theory are constituted by the experi-mental
practices of the laboratory or (what I have called) “readable technologies.” How is it
that the same terms have two different meanings and are applied to two different
objects? Because science works under the hermeneutical umbrella of culture, it has a
history, a community, and a freedom that is unintelligible and unexplainable by theory
alone. The two meanings, one deriving from theory and the other deriving from praxis,
come together contingently and freely in the local life-world of scientists and others
trained in the use of appropriate readable technologies. T hese meanings can be
connected by figures of speech, by metaphor or analogy. Usually, however, either the
theoretical meaning is used mistakenly to trump – more precisely, to replace – the
practical one, as when philosophers of science recite the mantra that scientific phenomena are – “univocally” and “literally” – theory-laden, or the practical (post-theoretical) meaning is mistakenly identified with the pre-theoretical meaning, as when
scientists and science writers talk down to the general public using images and analogies
from daily life.
How firm is the age-old belief that scientific thinking dispels ambiguity, diversity,
contingency of meaning, and metaphor? This belief which stems from Plato and
Aristotle was adopted by modern science and incorporated into the early scientific
metaphor of the “lynx-eyed.” The Roman Accademia dei Lincei (predecessor of the
present Papal Academy of Sciences) to which Galileo belonged, was the name of one
of the earliest academies of science in Europe. Early modern scientists saw themselves
as ‘seeing’ more keenly than merely human eyes the shape, number, and quantity of
things. As theoretical scientific vocabularies these terms were thought to be no more
than specifications of the visual shapes, numbers, and quantities that belong to the lifeworld – perhaps, as ideal or limiting cases of these, as Koyré and Husserl thought. But
they are not so. They turn out, instead, to be specified by mathematical models related
to the life-world by measurement, and processes of measurement are not like seeing,
they are more like working with tools in a black box. Eventually, the black box is
opened, and I discuss below the new post-theoretical phenomena that are found there.
The importance of metaphor for science, however, and for a correct understanding of
the history of science has to be recognized.
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W hat then are the post-theoretical phenomena of science? They are new furniture
for an ever-changing historical life-world. The river of life, history, language, and
culture runs through life-worlds and in its flow it never stops revising and reshaping
life-worlds. New invariants and symmetries are created that diversify both subjects and
objects. The dynamic of a community’s history is driven by its culture, and its culture
is driven by science and technology ever transmuting the present into a free and
contingent future. The optimism of this principle tends to be muted by its pessimistic
counterpart: there is no guarantee that a free and contingent future will be a progressive
one. W hether the future – or, for that matter, the present – is healthy/progressive and on
the road to survive or in decline and on the road to extinction is not something that the
sciences can judge. This can be done only by a culture informed by historical, moral,
and religious thought whose parts like the whole are sheltered under the one
hermeneutical umbrella.
W hen the modern trajectories of philosophy and natural science crossed, they
influenced one another in fateful ways. Analytical philosophy of science is the residue
of such a crossing that reflects both the enormous prestige of theoretical thinking and
a strong cultural preference for the Naturwissenschaften over the Geisteswissenschaften. In England and the USA, the privilege given to theory and to modern physics
was carried over into the philosophy of science, and even to philosophy itself.
Philosophy and the philosophy of science lost touch with the grass roots of reality, with
particulars, history, freedom, society, survival. If we concede, as we should, that the
sciences are of and about, not just theories and systems, but real life-worlds, then
science begins and ends in the scientists’ life-world where theories are eventually used
to produce post-theoretical phenomena. Philosophy, being also a theory user, should
also ask: how should theory function within philosophy so as to understand the grass
roots of human experience? Philosophy and science should go beyond the role of
theory to the phenomenology and hermeneutics of the grass roots. Up until recently,
Continental Philosophy tended to dwell almost exclusively on the deformations
associated with theoretical scientific thinking, while analytic philosophy dwelt almost
exclusively on the beauty of its successful theoretical models. Recalling, however, that
theory enters essentially into all inquiry, its positive role needs also to be researched
within the traditions of Continental Philosophy. That has always been my aim.
Before taking up philosophy as a career, I studied theoretical physics and did
research in theoretical geophysics. I also took courses on relativistic cosmological
models by Erwin Schrödinger and John Synge at the Institute for Advanced Studies in
Dublin and taught the subject to graduate students. I worked as a post-doc at Princeton
with Eugene W igner on the localization of elementary particles, using quantum field
theory, and later had many conversations with W erner Heisenberg about the quantum
theory. I found that this scientific material contained enough philosophical “mysteries”
of the grass roots kind to last a lifetime and beyond. I also found, however, that most
of them were related to one another and were generated by the single assumption that
universal theory, scientific and/or philosophical, in contrast with local knowledge,
constitutes the goal of human inquiry. W hile addressing specific questions, I found
myself grappling with systemic weaknesses in both Analytic and Continental Philosophy
focused on the mediations whereby scientific research passes from the recognition of
a problem to the acceptance of a solution. W hat are these mediations? First, the initial
problem presents itself as an experience in the pre-theoretical life-world of a scientific
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community that does not understand it and is ready to take steps to come to an
understanding of it. The first step is to transform the problem by finding a suita-ble
hypothesis/theory. The hypothesis/theory is then transformed by laboratory practices
into a new kind of problem which depends on new theory-laden technologies. The new
technologies in turn produce new sets of experiences different from the initial
experience and take place in a changed post-theoretical life-world different from the
initial life-world of the unsolved problem. This outcome is then freely taken to be the
solution to the original problem under the conditions set by the original search for
understanding. The cycle of activities is transformative not only of the local ambient
life-world of the researchers through the addition of new local technologies, but also of
the members of the local scientific community, of local scientific language, representations, and media. These steps form a sequence of time-ordered human activities,
many of them freely made and without guarantee of success, that can only be described
in narrative form that belongs to the genre of the history of science. This kind of narrative makes sense only on the presumption of one local hermeneutical cultural umbrella.
After exchanging the practice of physics for the profession of philosophy, I
addressed the following challenging philosophical topics:
A HERMENEUTIC PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Ë A Husserlean intentionality analysis of the early Bohr-Heisenberg view of the quantum theory; of quantum
logic as a context logic of differently embodied inquirers; of the problems of causality and localization in
quantum mechanics.
Ë Heideggerian analysis of the ontological status of measurement and laboratory data.
Ë The Husserlean group transformation structure of perceptual objects in general, and of theoretically
denominated laboratory entities construed as perceptual objects.
Ë A critique of David Marr’s program for machine perception.
VAN GOGH’S EYES
Ë A study of Vincent Van Gogh’s painting, Bedroom at Arles (1888), of the art and aesthetics of the (negatively
curved) local Riemannian pictorial space achieved by the artist and how the artist used the theory and
technology of perspective to achieve his purpose.
GOD
Ë Using a common philosophically understood method underlying theology and natural science, scientists who
are religious and theologians who respect the processes of natural science should be able to gain reliable
experiential, intellectual, and rational knowledge both of Nature, the subject matter of the natural sciences,
and of God, the subject matter of religion.

A HERMENEUTIC PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
My introduction to philosophical research was influenced in equal parts by the writings
of Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Hans-Georg Gadamer,
and Paul Ricoeur, and the lectures of Jean Ladrière at the University of Leuven
(Louvain). Leuven is the location of the Husserl Archives. I also owe much to the
influence of Bernard J.F. Lonergan, S.J., especially to his Insight and Method in
Theology. My phenomenological research was tempered from the start, then, by
recourse to Aristotle, Aquinas, and Kant. Later I was to find among my American
colleagues some who moved me further in the direction of existential hermeneutics,
such as W illiam Richardson, S.J., Joseph J. Kockelmans, Theodore Kisiel, Hugh
Silverman, and Babette Babich. I discovered many of the more technical details of
philosophy and the history of science in discussion with the analytic philosophers at the
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Pittsburgh Center for the History and Philosophy of Science where in 1983 I was a
senior fellow.
W hat I learned from Lonergan is the importance of the starting point in any inquiry.
Insight into insight or the “phenomenology” of insight became for me the starting point
for a philosophy of science. A similar but richer message came from the phenomenological tradition with its emphasis on “die Sache selbst,” which in Husserlean language
is the object constituted as known by language, community, history, technology, and the
human body, and revealed through the intentionality of inquiry. One begins, not as
Plato, Descartes and Hume did, by asking the epistemological question: what can we
know? (for we don't know whether we are competent to answer it), but, as Aristotle,
Aquinas, Husserl, Heidegger, and Lonergan did, with the ontological question: what is
knowing? W hich leads to the further questions: what do we do when we know, and why
is this doing a knowing? For the answers to these must be in some sense self-evident;
the Being of Knowing must be – in some sense to be uncovered prior to the beginning
of any trustworthy inquiry – the Knowing of Being.
M y first book, Quantum Mechanics and Objectivity (1965), studied the
intentionality-structure of quantum mechanics under the original Bohr-Heisenberg
account, and criticized the later, more frequently held, objectivist account of John von
Neumann and Eugene W igner that construed the quantum theory as a new universal
theory of physics. In the Bohr-Heisenberg account, the quantum theory spoke about the
(observed) microsystem as it was revealed to a macroscopic observer through the
process of measurement. Measurement for Bohr and Heisenberg was central; it was
quantitative, technological, social, historical, linguistic, teleological, and local. It was
the action of one local part of the humanly inhabited cosmos on another local part that
strangely (to classical epistemologists!) had the capacity to change both local observer
and observed. This mysterious capacity does not lie in the non-physical or spiritual
agency of the human Mind, as proposed by von Neumann and W igner, but in the
intentional character of the measurement process and its ability to shape the way an
object – here a quantum mechanical object – is “dressed” to make its appearance as a
cultural object within the context of a particular culture, in this case a local historical
scientific community.
I was to do much further study on these and other topics, among them quantum
logic, measurement, locality, and causality which are names for the set of
epistemological problems associated with the quantum theory that are particularly
recalcitrant to classical epistemology.
Quantum logic studies the deviance in truth-functionality that seems to characterize
experimental sentences in quantum mechanics. For many logicians, quantum mechanics
seems to involve either a third truth-value intermediate between T(ruth) and F(alsity),
say, I(ndeterminacy) or a range of truth-values between 0 and 1. In either case, there
is deep uneasiness about the objective goals of both science and logic. I found the basic
paper of Birkhoff and von Neumann incoherent and claimed that in keeping with BohrHeisenberg's original interpretation of quantum mechanics it was sufficient to hold that
any experimental sentence formulated in quantum mechanics becomes truth-functional
(either T or F) only conditional to the prior implementation of a specific local
measurement process. In my view, since truth-functionality in quantum mechanics is
locally context-dependent, quantum logic should be addressed as a specific case of local
contextuality in sentential logic. This solution, though often anthologized in quantum
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logic collections, offended against several dominant perspectives: the nominalism of the
logical empiricists and the objectivism inherent in the new universalist interpretation of
quantum mechanics. It also offended, on the one hand, the universalist historicopolitical leanings of the neokantian founders of the logical empiricist school and, on the
other, the postmodernist longings of those who looked to the “weirdness” of the
quantum theory for disembodied spiritual inspiration. The articulation of the notion of
contextuality requires sophisticated tools and techniques that stem from Continental
approaches to knowledge, using, for example, such notions as intentionality,
phenomenology, constitution, history, hermeneutics, and local embodiment. Such
philosophic tools are simply not available to objectivist social science or analytic
(rationalist or empiricist) philosophy. The use of Continental tools unlocked for me
some of the “mysteries” of the quantum theory and opened up a large field of inquiry
that I hope others will be able to develop and appropriate in time.
Among the topics of outstanding importance for the understanding not just of
quantum mechanics but of all empirical science is measurement, for the measurement
process is that which can bring model-defined “theoretical entities” into the domain of
human culture and perception, revealing them as cultural entities of scientific laboratory
culture. Among these cultural entities, some become perceptual entities under the
philosophical criteria implicit in Husserl's (Hilbert inspired) analysis of the noeticnoematic invariances of any perceptual object under the group theoretic variation of its
characteristic profiles. By measurement the theoretical and quantitative language of a
model gets translated into a cultural and perceptual life-world language. Look! we say,
that trace (one of the characteristic group theoretic profiles of) is a proton with 10 Mev
energy in this local setup. Measurement is where the language of theory gets “dressed”
within a social, historical, and technological context with local perceptual “clothes.”
Measurement is a hermeneutic performance, like the playing and replaying of a game
or like a musical or theatrical performance. Bob Crease has developed this notion in
a book called The Play of Nature. This is not the literary hermeneutics of
author/text/reader (ATR) but the existential hermeneutics of coded-energy/embodiedreceptor/lifeworld-interpretation (CE/ER/LI, perhaps), which is the transcendental
structure of human perception in the tradition of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger,
and Lonergan.
My approach to the problems of localization and causality in quantum mechanics
was influenced by a study I began in the late sixties (and recently revisited) of the
pictorial space of Vincent Van Gogh's painting, “The Bedroom at Arles.” This led to
a comparison between, on the one hand, the non-Euclidean spaces of visual and
pictorial presentations and, on the other, the Euclidean space of science and traditional
mathematical perspective. The Van Gogh study was sparked by discussions at a course
(on differential geometry) given by Erwin Schrödinger at the Dublin Institute for
Advanced Studies in the late 1940’s and by a lecture I gave some years later at Fordham
University on pictorial spaces at the invitation of my friend, the distinguished art
historian, Irma B. Jaffe. The metric structures of visual and pictorial spaces fascinated
me because they seemed to follow a negatively curved Riemannian metric rather than
the Euclidean metric of classical physics which both culture and philosophy assume to
be the one and only, “true,” “real” and “actual” space of experience. This problem led
to my second book.
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Space-Perception and the Philosophy of Science (1983/1988) is a book about the
philosophy of science, but it is often read as a book about vision. It uses vision as a
starting point and helpful illustration that shows how to address the analysis of science
from the standpoint of an embodied, hermeneutical and phenomenological philosophy.
I show that the shapes, sizes, and distances that people actually see in the life-world and
in pictures do not fit a Euclidean space but seem to belong rather to members of the
two-parameter family of finite hyperbolic Riemannian spaces. (One parameter is
correlated with the overall diameter of the visual space and the other with the distance
from the viewer of the local quasi-Euclidean zone of vision directly in front of the
viewer’s eyes.) The finitude of the cosmos and the locality of places and times were
accepted by Plato, Aristotle, and nearly all of the ancient philosophers and by most
people till the end of the fourteenth century. However, the new technologies of
perspective, mapping, navigation, and time keeping changed all that and made it
possible for the cultural elite to entertain belief in a single infinite – terrestrial and
heavenly – Euclidean space and a single universal time The authority of a single
cosmological geometry and a single cosmological time over the multiplicity of local
perceptual places and times was full blown by the times of Descartes and Newton, and
has persisted right up to the present day.
The conclusion of Part I of my Space-Perception is that the scientific (posttheoretical) organization of space does not have to be single, universal, and theoretically Euclidean, but could be local, contextual, and theoretically Riemannian. Each form
of organization is tied hermeneutically to some form of local practical appreciation of
the environment. It is Euclidean if attention is paid to the “carpentering” of the
environment, and Riemannian if attention is paid to the purposefulness of direct local
action in the world. Local places and times do not have to be “irrational,” they too can
be scientific with the discovery that the presentations of self to the world and vice versa
are often deployed in daily life in Riemannian metric spaces.
In Part II of Space-Perception, I address the following questions: W hat philosophical weight should be given to modern science given that it narrowed the options of
spatial theory to just the Euclidean? W hat “reality” weights should be assigned to the
diversity of modes of spatial perception when contrasted with the uniqueness of
Euclidean space? Do answers to these questions throw any light on the “mysteries” of
quantum mechanics?
The phenomenological principle is that the local life-world is the primary horizon
of perception within which reality is given to individual humans. This principle takes
issue both with rationalist criteria (the privilege of theory over practice) and the
empiricist criteria (the privilege of measured data over cultural perception). One of the
sources of paradoxes for scientific modernity is the tension in common usage between
theory and practice, measurement and perception. This tension is resolved only when
it is understood that reality (in a philosophical analysis) is never given absolutely in a
unique way, but is always given locally in a local space for a local community for local
purposes and, therefore, in spaces with possibly different metrical structure. If in
keeping with the above principle, scientific reality is the phenomenolo-gical “die Sache
selbst,” then the local “being-in-the-world” within which it is given is a local laboratory
culture. Reality, then, is always given to a human locally, and its furniture is “dressed”
characteristically for that local situation according to the Husserlian-Hilbertian
theoretical criteria referred to above.

444

PATRICK A. HEELAN, S.J.

One of the standard “mysteries” of quantum mechanics is that particles are not
localized spatial entities before they are measured. The reason for this, I claim, is that,
prior to the setup of a measurement process, there is no constituted, local life-world
space in which a particle can make its appearance. Setting up a measurement process
then constitutes the local life-world space (here, it is the local laboratory culture) in
which a particle can display itself as a localized entity. W ith this analysis the
“localization problem” in quantum mechanics disappears. A problem of understanding,
however, remains. What quantum mechanics seems to be saying is that in a world
where all real entities are of necessity localized even in science, quantum particles are
exceptions. But when properly understood, quantum mechanics should be interpreted
as saying that in a world where real spatiality is always of a local life-world kind, the
relevant life-world space has first to be constituted before objects can be experienced
as localized entities. In science, however, the local life-world space for scientific
observers is constituted by an implemented measurement process, and it is in this space
that the particle is “dressed” to display itself to local scientific observers.
Following the same analysis, the “causality problem” in quantum mechanics also
disappears. Causality (in the Humean sense) is defined as the lawful ordering of
localized events in before/after sequences. Since in quantum mechanics things are not
localized prior to measurement, they cannot be said to participate in orderly before/after
sequences of interactions prior to the setting up of a space-constituting measurement
process.
So much for quantum mechanics. A final word on machine perception: if visual and
other perceptual spaces are hermeneutically engendered and if they are Riemannian
within non-carpentered life-world spaces, then the machine processing of Euclidean
optical signals can go only so far before it encounters the need to be guided by topdown local cultural factors. These are the kinds of active cultural intentions that are at
the core of narratives of human life and to which Riemannian vision is culturally
attuned. Machine processing beyond this point is possible only if the machine is already
a servant of the culture and not its master.
VAN GOGH’S EYES
Returning to pictorial vision, I was early fascinated by the realism of Van Gogh’s
paintings, particularly of his Bedroom at Arles (1888) which I had seen at the Chicago
Art Institute and which gripped me with the experience of a transfixing presence that
I can only describe as being in that room. As I mentioned above, I took a course on
Riemannian geometry given by Erwin Schrödinger at the Dublin Institute for Advanced
Studies in the late forties. During the course, he raised the question: was it possible to
see – or, at least, imagine – a non-Euclidean or Riemannian world? W asn’t such an
intuition of space necessary just to be able to do Riemannian geometry?
Some elliptic and hyperbolic three-dimensional (3D) Riemannian spaces are finite
in size, and since they are not in themselves closed by any enclosing Riemannian 3D
surface, they would, if experienced as the container of the visible cosmos, be
experienced from the viewer’s position at the center as spatially unlimited, though not
infinite – something like the finite but unlimited character of the 2D surface of a sphere
if it were to be explored by a 2D visitor. Riemannian spaces would then be model
spaces for visual worlds, like Euclidean space for “carpentered” measured worlds.
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Though the geometrical metric is new, the basic idea is as old as Aristotle, for Aristotle
says in De Coelo (279a) that beyond the starry heavens, there is nothing, not even empty
space.
In Chicago I seemed to recognize in the local pictorial space of the painting the
features of such a finite but nevertheless unenclosed space which is the local space of
his bedroom as experienced by almost any viewer. The noisy, everyday world was not
represented, but was it excluded merely by omission or in a still more definitive way?
Try to imagine what you, the viewer, would see if, when looking at the painting, the
closed shutters were opened. You would find, I think, one of two possible alternatives.
Either the finite yet unenclosed space of the room would have to change to
accommodate the new presence of an intrusive busy everyday world, or else one’s
vision had to be blocked by a solid object such as, maybe, a solid sky like the skies in
many of Van Gogh paintings. For beyond the bedroom, beyond its closed shutters and
walls, there is nothing, not even empty space. T hen I asked myself, could it be that
Vincent had discovered the art and aesthetics of suggesting a local (for empirical
reasons, a negatively curved) Riemannian world space? Here was a scientific problem
wrapped in an aesthetic problem and an aesthetic problem wrapped in a scientific
problem. W as it true that the viewer’s perception was captured by the unlimited finitude
of (a negatively curved) Riemannian space? If so, how was this achieved? W hat
technique did Vincent use?
In Auvers-sur-Oise where he died, there is a statue by Zadkin of Vincent Van Gogh
as a remote figure bent under the burden of the easel on his shoulder. As we know from
a letter to his brother T heo written from Arles, Vincent also carried about with him a
clumsy and costly perspective frame (“cadre perspectif”) which he used to make his
compositions. W hy? Because, as he wrote to Theo and his friend Emile Bernard, form
is very important for a painter, and on that account he does exercises in perspective to
perfect his ability to capture true form on a canvas. Perspective is a technique based on
a mathematical theory for projecting 3D objects onto a flat picture plane from a fixed
sight point. Its basic assumptions are that objective physical space is Euclidean (and,
of course, infinite), and rays of light follow straight lines and obey the laws of
geometrical optics in this space. Perspective is the proto-science that was historically
one of the paradigms for modern science. In his letters, Vincent claimed that his search
for true forms led him to discover a new, a “modern” (“moderne”) use of perspective
different from its “former” (“ancien”) use, by which he meant the way German, Italian,
and even Flemish artists used it. This, he believed, would necessitate a new art of color
and representation (“dessin”) and of how artists work (“la vie artistique”). So Vincent
had a technique, and one based on mathematical perspective. But what was it? He did
not say.
Even to ask such a question today would be taken by some critics and cultural
anthropologists to be artistically insensitive or worse, to be a kind of wickedness, for,
according to Natalie Heinich, a cultural anthropologist of heros and hero worship, and
author of The Glory of Vincent Van Gogh: An Anthropology of Admiration (1996), Van
Gogh is worshiped by posterity as a redemptive figure who, by his rejection in his own
lifetime and death, inspired artists with the courage to liberate themselves from objective rules, to free perception from perspective, creativity from rationality, and culture
from theory and especially from the alien authority of scientific theories. For this

446

PATRICK A. HEELAN, S.J.

reason, she writes, he “marks a turning point, an aesthetic, historical, and ethical
rereading of art.” He is the first postmodernist.
It is fair to say that the suffering Vincent was innocent of wanting to be a martyr for
postmodernism. He treated the science and practice of perspective as necessary for an
artist, but he discovered that its formal inflexibility quâ mere tool was complemented
by the eye’s flexibility in using it for different tasks. He respected it then as a
generalized tool for the artist to use in expressing visual form, and for the viewer as a
kind of “text” for the locally situated eye to “read” in “context.” For him perspective
was as necessary for vision as for artistic creativity, but in isolation from a specific
visual task perspectival depiction was incomplete, it was a “text” without a practical
life-world “context.” It accounted just for a part of what underlay the meaningful taskfilled meeting of subject and object, viewer and painting.
Vincent’s artistic problem was to depict his bedroom so that a viewer sees it as a
local finite yet unenclosed universe of peace, quiet, trust, and intimate companionship.
He accepted the tradition that mathematical perspective and the technology of the
perspective frame were the scientific tools a painter should use to depict a scene and he
used them because they were part of a tradition that linked painting to an artist’s
experience of what counted as “the true and the possible ... and the really existing” and
this “really existing” was for him in a real sense sacred. In so doing Vincent, however,
made two discoveries: firstly, that the eyes, searching in a picture for a visual
“language” that “speaks” of a meaningful local place, do not find the “language” just
in the universal “grammar” of perspective alone but only as complemented by ways of
looking that convey the experience of a local place with a local meaning and feeling;
secondly, that he could adapt the technology of the perspective frame in keeping with
mathematical theory (using, for example, diagonal lines in his grid rather than
horizontal-vertical lines) to make it serve his artistic goal of opening, within a viewer’s
local life-world space, the gates of feeling to reveal the beauty, peace, and intimacy of
that particular place, his bedroom. This constituted, I think, an essential part of his
“new” and “modern” use of perspective.
Vincent found a way of making it possible for a viewer to experience a particular
local motif by using a scientifically designed universal technology in a particular way
to shape the forms and colors on the canvas so that the artistic “utterance” as a whole
would evoke in the viewer the particularity of the local experience he intended to
convey. The product of this interpretive viewing is what phenomenology calls the
presentation of “the things themselves” (die Sachen selbst). Is this not what Van Gogh
meant by “the true and the possible as to form... and the really existing”? The taskfilled meaning of the Bedroom painting is not the architecture of the room or its
furniture as mere physical set-up, but its implied entry into the artist’s Bedroom-asTotal-W orld in a mood of peace, totality, intimacy, trust, and possibly, hoped-for
companionship, a gift only a prepared viewer, (Heidegger’s) Dasein as Ek-sistenz,
would be able to receive.
GOD
Since the recurring question in my Afterword reflections is about local (post-theoretical)
practical knowledge as the goal of science in contrast with universal theoretical
knowledge, I will end with some speculative reflections on the turning point of seeking
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in local practical knowledge an understanding of theological as well as scientific
knowledge.
I refer back to a paper I read at a meeting of scientists, philosophers, and theologians
at Notre-Dame University in 1993, entitled “Lonergan and the Measures of God.” It
asks whether people's religious and spiritual lives are based on purely theoretical, say,
philosophical or theological arguments, or on local practical lifeworld experiences. The
term “God” in the paper's title refers mostly to the God of Christian theology but can
be taken mutatis mutandis for the unique object of any monotheistic theological
thinking. The “measures of God” refer to the kind of local (post-theoretical) practical
knowledge that individual persons may have of the God described by their theological
belief.
“Lonergan” in the paper’s title is Bernard B.F. Lonergan, S.J. (1904-1984), a
Canadian philosopher and theologian who deeply influenced my thinking at the crucial
point in time when I turned my attention from physics to the philosophy of science. His
principal works are, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding (1957), focused mostly
on mathematics and the natural sciences, and Method in Theology (1972) focused on
theology. Both works are concerned with the development and assessment of scientific
understanding in the theoretical Aristotelian tradition of modern science. However,
unlike the former which is content to dwell in the construction and testing of natural
science theoretical models, the latter is forced by its subject matter to dwell also on the
transformation of propositional and theoretical belief into practical faith. Lonergan’s
word for this transformation is “conversion.” “By conversion,” he writes, “is
understood a transformation of the subject and his world ... it is as if one’s eyes were
opened and one’s former world faded or fell away” (Method, p. 130). This is replaced
by a new local (post-theoretical) life-world within which the subject comes to live.
Conversion is the outcome of free choice, love, and commitment and, while intensely
personal, it is also communal and can be handed on within a historical community.
Conversion, Lonergan says, is the foundation for theology.
But, is it not also the case that conversion is the foundation for science? That was
a moment of conversion, for example, in Galileo’s life when in the winter of 1609 he
made his telescopic discovery of the gibbous phases of Venus. It was then, as
astronomer Owen Gingrich once told me, that Galileo came to have complete faith in
the Copernican system. On that same day, he went to his desk and wrote his protocol
notes, not in Italian as he was accustomed to do, but in Latin, the universal language of
science. Speaking thereafter to all the world, G alileo stated that Nature is a Book
written in the language of geometry and the horizons of nature are structured by the
geometry of the Copernican system. Other natural philosophers continued to follow
Aristotle and Ptolemy, but for Galileo, astronomy, mechanics, and all of natural science
was a divine revelation about Nature expressed in God’s own language of mathematics.
For Galileo, mathematics was geometry and geometry was an idealization of measurable
shape, size, and motion. This conversion experience changed the direction of Galileo’s
scientific inquiry in fundamental ways; what formerly was experienced as relative to
place in a local geocentric system organized by a hierarchy of sensible qualities came
to be experienced as relative to an abstract heliocentric model organized on the basis
of measurable shape, size, and motion. W hat formerly, for example, was experienced
as a stone in local downward fall toward its natural place at the center of the Earth until
stopped by the ground came to be re-described, after his conversion, as a stone

448

PATRICK A. HEELAN, S.J.

following a parabolic trajectory above the surface of a turning Earth in a Sun-centered
cosmology as imagined by a disinterested viewer in outer space. The old facts
dissolved with the old perspective, and gave way to new facts generated by the new
perspective.
There was much yet to be researched and, perhaps, revised, but all began with a
human decision. The grounds for this decision would be debated by many even today
in historical retrospect. Galileo, however, made his fateful act of faith and committed
himself and his colleagues to a model, a set of experimental practices, and an
interpretation of them that would profoundly mark the next few centuries of W estern
culture and religion. His new scientific faith did not change an iota of the theory but,
like Van Gogh, it changed his life-world. Ultimately it changed ours too in fundamental
ways. In changing that life-world, which was more important? The theory? The
practices? The virtuosi in all parts of Europe that also committed their faith to the new
scientific process? Nor must we forget the emerging new economic, military, political,
bureaucratic, and other orders that would find it in their interest to join the movement
of modern science. All of these collaborated in a commitment of faith to support and
develop a community of empirico-mathematical natural philosophers.
For what end? Basically, though much to the surprise of many of our
contemporaries, it was for a theological end: to possess, as far as possible, a divine
guarantee of unity and simplicity in Nature. The fall of the old cosmology had created
a theological rift that for cultural reasons had to be filled, for the old geocentric lifeworld of antiquity that the Christian community inherited contained a host of traditional
images and symbols that worked for both nature and the Christian faith, while the new
heliocentric life-world was at first embarrassingly empty of useful theological images.
Galileo. being a devout Christian, tried, not too successfully, to supply such images in
his debates with theologians, but it was not until Newton published his System of the
World that Nature was once again filled – but only for a time – with theological
meaning. Absolute Space and gravitation became the symbolic venue where Nature and
Divine Providence worked together to maintain the stability of the W orld System. It
will probably always be so that theology will be linked with the science of the natural
order (though whether the natural order includes, as I would hold, the cultural order is
a decision about which many would disagree), because as long as the science of the
natural order seeks an intrinsic unity in some Final Account, such an account must
surely be in some sense theological.
Scientists are thought to know, while theologians are thought just to believe. It
should be clear from what has been said that the intellectual environment of science,
like the intellectual environment of theology, is full of local historical background, some
of which masquerades as universal knowledge. More precisely, much of what is called
scientific knowledge is not universal, trans-cultural, and trans-temporal, as it (usually)
purports to be – but is the product of the faith researchers have in experts belonging to
their local historical scientific community.
Finally, just as a good philosophy of natural science needs Lonergan’s Method in
Theology, so a good theology needs to reflect more on the scientific structures studied
in Insight. I shall try to make plausible the claim that the foundation of theology in
conversion, history, and transformations of life-world horizons must have its own
analogue, a quasi-laboratory to complement the consecrated words and practices of a
religious tradition. By a quasi-laboratory I mean a domain for empirical investigation
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so set off by common background and context that relevant data can be harvested with
security in terms of some antecedent theoretical – here, theological – model. New
theological insight is not limited to pure theoretical speculation or the study of the
literary works of dead theologians, institutional councils, and leadership, but comes also
from the study of current religious witness, a quasi-laboratory where theological insights
and theories are used, successfully or unsuccessfully, by expert religious and spiritual
guides and witnesses.
Such a claim may be unsettling in the Catholic theological context because, among
other reasons, it raises the specter of enthusiasm, old and new, from the Shakers and
Quietists of the seventeenth century to the present-day Pentecostalists, and the threat
enthusiasm always poses to academic theologians and hierarchical institutions.
Theologians and institutions have enormous reluctance to use their theological theories
or theory-laden canons to “measure” and pass judgment on local events of a religious
character. I stress the context of “measurement,” for measurements are done
individually, case by individual case, each constrained by place, community, and
history. In “Belief: Today’s Issue,” a paper he read to Pax Romana in 1968, Lonergan
gave among his own reasons for this reluctance: God is not an entity within this world
and so cannot become known by experience; no one knows God face-to-face in this life
and so no one can look for confirmation of theological theories in human religious
experience. In 1968 Lonergan took the position that there was no quasi-laboratory that
could provide, as it were, public ecclesial “measures” of religious experience, or, at
least speaking to Pax Romana, he was unwilling to defend such a position. W hatever
one might say in defense of the influence of Dionysos on the Platonic tradition, at least
within the context of Apollonian classical thinking in theology, Dionysos has no part
to play.
Four years later, however, in Method, and to a different audience, he makes a
stunningly different claim: theology in relation to religious experience is like economics
in relation to business. Religious life can flourish without theology, just as business can
flourish without economics, but just as economics results from intellectual inquiry into
business, so theology results – or should result, he says – from intellectual inquiry into
religious life. Lonergan gives the old word faith a new meaning: “Faith,” he says, “is
the knowledge born of religious love” (p. 115), it is the cognitive intentional
counterpart of that transformation of the life-world wrought by sanctifying grace; faith
makes possible a conversion that opens horizons of religious experience. He
distinguishes, as I do, faith from religious belief. The latter is the readiness to accept
the historically sedimented pattern of communal understanding that people living within
a religious tradition have, based on the totality of their religious culture, comprising
sacred books, rituals, accepted teachings, and other cultural traditions of use in daily
life. In contrast with religious belief, faith, being the knowledge born of love, expresses
its interiority in four stages: religious experience; insight or theory-making; judgment
or theory-accepting or -rejecting; and responsible decision which is the
self-transcendent outcome of the loving part of faith’s interior intention.
By the time Method appeared in 1972, Lonergan was ready to accept the fact and
necessity of a quasi-laboratory of faith, a community practice able to provide the experts
with, as it were, public “measures” of the life of faith.
I turn now specifically to Christianity. For the purpose of this paper I take it to be
a community defined by faith in a God, Creator of the Cosmos, but not a part of it, who
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has made a historic covenant with a free human community offering individual, social,
and, perhaps, even cosmic redemption through the incarnation, death, and resurrection
of his Son, Jesus Christ, in the Church that was founded by the Holy Spirit. The
Christian question would be, whether faith in such a God, articulated by theologians and
administered by the institutional Church, can be referred to a particular historical
quasi-laboratory of religious experience, in which theological statements about living
“in the spirit of faith” can be “measured” or “tested” by experiential signs interpreted
as marked with a divine approval.
Such a question may sound strange, perhaps very strange indeed, coming from a
practicing Catholic. Beyond the Catholic community, however, there is no such
reluctance; one finds today a plethora of religious theologies stemming, for example,
from interpretations of contemporary evolutionary and cosmological science. One of
the reasons for the widespread appeal of Stephen Hawking’s A Brief History of Time is
his argument that astrophysical theories can lead the religious inquirer to the “Mind of
God.” Since all scientific theories aim at prediction and control, this kind of argument
deeply undercuts our image of human life, for it presupposes a metaphysics where
human freedom is absent and human decisions are pre-ordained by neurological circuits.
Existence in this story is determined by cosmological “crunches” and “rebirths” which,
though bearing some reminiscence of the mythic cosmological cycles of the Great Year
of Stoic or Hindu cosmology with their “eternal return of the Same,” are nevertheless
of an entirely different genre; they are secular, not sacred, predictions. B y contrast,
what is characteristic at least of Christianity is the drama of the biblical narratives that
underline human freedom in making history in the life-world in which we live. Instead
of looking to cosmological models, should we not, following Lonergan, look for a
quasi-laboratory of religious experience where human freedom is respected and history
retains its edge of uncertainty? Such is more likely to be a faith community of people
productive, as Lonergan has said, of “works of self-transcendent love animated by
faith,” – among whom some are expert in interpreting theologically the horizons of
critical religious experience.
In such a quasi-laboratory community, what would be the “measures”? One
suggestion is criteria afforded, for instance, by techniques of “spiritual discernment.”
By “spiritual discernment” I mean prayerful techniques equipped with practical
theological language and responsive, say, to what the Christian tradition calls the
“spiritual senses” which serve to “measure” divine presence and action in a community.
Such historical practices of spiritual discernment were taught throughout the history of
the Church and have been an essential part of good or “perfect” Christian living for two
thousand years. Borrowed from the Stoics and other pre-Christian sources, they were
adapted for Christianity by the desert fathers and monks and they are still taught and
practiced and monitored by spiritual directors today. Such Christian spiritual exercises
introduce the better prepared and motivated to a religious path where everyday
decisions within the life-world context are examined in the light of spiritual criteria
traditional to the path being followed.
One such set of practices of spiritual discernment, for example, is taught by St.
Ignatius Loyola, the founder of the Jesuit Order, in his Spiritual Exercises. Such
spiritual exercises, as Pierre Hadot has shown in his Philosophy as a Way of Life
(1995), have their roots in ancient philosophy, in Socrates, the Stoics, and Epicurus, for
whom wisdom was a form of practical reason focused on the divine. The exercises of

AFTERW ORD

451

Ignatius lead participants in silent prayer to play the role of actors in Gospel narratives,
representing themselves as disciples eager to share the life of the faith community of
Jesus. Ignatius and other spiritual writers speak of the experience of “spiritual senses.”
These bear an analogy to the physical senses: of the “eyes” of faith, the “bitterness” of
remorse, the “sweetness” of charity, the “tears” of divine love and sorrow or, more
generally, of “spiritual touches,” “consolation,” and “desolation.” All such information
is structured a priori by theological language in some way analogous to the way
laboratory information is structured by scientific theory, but stressing the individuality
of each participant. W ith the scientific analogy in mind, can we then speak of such
spiritual exercises as constituting a quasi-laboratory of religious experience?
Laboratory experimentation and its protocols are properly described in narrative
form, because every experiment is particular, involving actions of particular people at
a definite place and time, motivated by a common purpose, equipped with an
explanatory theory, and brought to the bar of experience as subject to a jury of peer
experts. So, too, would religious experience in the quasi-laboratory of spiritual
exercises be presented in narrative form under explanatory theological categories.
I have argued that both science and theology should exhibit the range of structures
that Lonergan describes in Method and Insight. Such a conclusion does not guarantee
that the natural sciences reveal the God of the Bible. W hat it shows is merely that there
is a common philosophically understood method underlying theology and natural
science, and that using that method within the established traditions of Christian life and
practice, scientists who are Christian and theologians who respect the processes of
natural science should be able to gain reliable experiential, intellectual, and rational
knowledge both of Nature, the subject matter of the natural sciences, and of the
Christian Trinitarian God, the subject matter of the Christian religion.
Finally, I want to address the editor of this handsome volume, Dr. Babette Babich,
and the authors who contributed to this wonderful collection to speak my delight,
wonder, and thanks! The collection, though dedicated to my honor, really celebrates
no one individual unless it is the äáéìïí (great spirit), Eros, of whom the wise woman
Diotima in Plato’s Symposium says, that he is neither wise nor ignorant for “he is the
interpreter between the gods and men.”

